Coalition governance and municipal stability in South Africa: Institutional challenges and reform imperatives

Since 2000, South Africa’s local government system has largely been characterised by the rule of dominant parties, mainly under the African National Congress (ANC).

However, the 2016 and 2021 local government elections produced widespread “hung councils,” compelling political parties to form coalition governments. Coalition governance has thus become a structural feature of South Africa’s local political landscape.

Coalitions may, in principle, strengthen democracy by providing multiparty oversight and reducing unilateral executive dominance. They can also promote broader participation and counterbalance entrenched single-party decision-making power. However, local evidence suggests that coalitions formed out of necessity rather than shared ideology are often fragile, vulnerable to personality clashes, policy incoherence, and frequent executive turnover. This instability has generated significant governance disruptions, undermining service delivery, fiscal stability, and institutional continuity.

This article reports on findings of an empirical survey conducted among three target groups, namely chairpersons of portfolio or oversight committees (TG1, n=20), senior municipal officials (i.e., municipal managers, chief financial officers, directors, portfolio managers) (TG2, n=19), and local government experts (e.g., academia, former municipal executives, members of provincial legislatures, and policy analysts) (TG3, n=13) regarding challenges experienced in coalition-led municipalities. Primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews (n=52). Based on the findings, reform imperatives to address systemic causes of coalition instability are recommended.

From dominant party stability to coalition volatility

Since the 2016 local government elections, several major municipalities, including the City of Johannesburg, City of Tshwane, and Nelson Mandela Bay, produced councils without outright majorities. The 2021 elections intensified this pattern, normalising multi-party governments across municipal tiers. These coalition arrangements are typically characterised by:

  • narrow and unstable majorities;
  • ideological heterogeneity;
  • frequent leadership changes; and
  • contestation over executive positions and committee chairpersonships.

The administrative consequences are significant. Municipal managers must operate in an environment where executive authority can shift abruptly through motions of no confidence. Long-term strategic plans are frequently interrupted, and budget approval processes are politicised. Institutional culture, previously oriented towards predictable political direction, is destabilised by recurrent political recalibration. The resulting volatility has tangible costs, reflecting not only political contestation but institutional misalignment between coalition dynamics and administrative design.

Results and findings

Empirical evidence revealed that political instability profoundly affected both political and administrative decision-making. Approximately 65% of political respondents and 64% of administrative respondents reported frequent disruption. Key manifestations include delays in council decisions and approvals; repetition of administrative processes; stalled policy implementation; and missed compliance deadlines (e.g., MFMA requirements). In addition, administrative neutrality was significantly compromised. Political actors increasingly influenced operational decisions such as procurement, appointments, and project prioritisation.

It seems that the budget is a central site of coalition contestation, often prioritising political compromise over developmental priorities. Coalition dynamics significantly disrupt municipal budgeting processes. Up to 48% of senior managers experienced frequent or consistent delays and budget negotiations became politicised bargaining arenas. In addition, transparency in inter-party negotiations seems to be low. This weakened fiscal discipline and delayed service delivery programmes and projects.

As far as oversight and accountability are concerned, oversight institutions, particularly Municipal Public Accounts Committees (MPACs) and portfolio committees, were found to be structurally weakened. Only a minority were considered effective, while 85% of participants indicated oversight was politicised and that committees often fail to meet the quorum requirements. Furthermore, oversight processes are often used strategically for political leverage rather than accountability. Irregular expenditure was sometimes approved without adequate scrutiny, reflecting both political pressure and capacity deficits.

It is evident that coalition instability had direct and measurable impacts on service delivery. Sixty-five percent of participants reported frequent or occasional disruptions; infrastructure projects that are delayed or halted, and the fact that basic services (e.g., water, sanitation, and waste management) experience significant backlogs. These outcomes reinforce the decline in community trust in councils.

As far as the structural drivers of coalition instability are concerned, the study showed that volatility primarily stems from the following:

  • Power struggles driven by competition for executive positions.
  • Coalition partners often lacked coherent policy alignment, resulting in policy inconsistency, strategic drift, and implementation delays.
  • Access to municipal resources (e.g., budgets, tenders, appointments) is a central source of conflict.
  • Low trust and poor communication were prevalent, mainly due to shifting alliances, non-transparent negotiations, and breakdown in inter-party coordination.
  • The Municipal Structures Act does not adequately regulate coalition governance, creating a legal vacuum, weak enforcement mechanisms, and absence of dispute resolution systems.
  • Coalition governance had a predominantly negative effect on the culture of municipal organisations. Seventy four percent of the participants reported negative impacts such as poor morale, fragmentation in the workplace, and reduced innovation and organisational cohesion.

Towards a comprehensive framework for coalition governance

The overarching finding of the study was that key systemic institutional weaknesses characterise coalition governance. This finding highlights the lack of institutionalised coalition governance frameworks and the limited diffusion and operationalisation of the South African Local Government Association (SALGA)’s 2021 Coalition Framework, resulting in municipalities relying predominantly on ad hoc governance arrangements. Sixty-nine percent of experts rated current frameworks as poor, while 63% of officials indicated that they are not familiar with any coalition management framework.

Based on the thematic analysis of responses obtained from the three target groups, six strategic issues were identified that may serve as key pillars of a coalition governance reform framework. 

Pillar 1: Coalition governance systems

This pillar comprises the conceptualisation and operationalisation of formalised power‑sharing frameworks among parties, which explicitly specify lines of authority, allocations of responsibilities, and distributions of decision‑making rights across coalition members. It should include the establishment of formal coalition management committees responsible for strategic oversight, coordination of activities, and monitoring of collective performance. Decision-making processes should be grounded in consensus-based mechanisms, ensuring that policy directions and operational choices reflect the deliberative agreement of all relevant stakeholders. These procedures should be codified in coalition charters specifying the coalition’s mission, organisational structure, membership criteria, decision rules, accountability frameworks, and conflict‑resolution protocols.

Pillar 2: Legislative and policy Reform

Legislative reform is indispensable and may be advanced through the promulgation of binding coalition-specific policy that institute a formal, legally enforceable regulatory framework governing the formation, operation, and termination of coalition governments. Motions of no confidence should be regulated in formal legislation through clearly defined procedural and substantive criteria to prevent their opportunistic or strategic misuse and to enhance the stability and accountability of the executive.

Pillar 3: Accountability and oversight

Accountability and oversight should be enhanced by the institutional independence and functional autonomy of MPACs; the promotion of transparency through systematic disclosure of information and broaden structured mechanisms for public participation; and the implementation of a robust consequence management frameworks to ensure accountability and enforce compliance with governance and financial management standards.

Pillar 4: Managerial and administrative professionalisation

It is proposed that a merit-based appointment systems for staff should be promoted that clearly delineate political–administrative boundaries. In addition, robust mechanisms for institutional continuity should be established.

Pillar 5: Competence and capacity building

It is proposed that entities such as the LGSETA and SALGA design and implement targeted capacity-building programmes in negotiation and political governance to foster ethically grounded municipal leadership. Furthermore, the promotion of structured, continuous professional development interventions is warranted to enhance and sustain norms and practices associated with sound, developmental-oriented local governance.

Pillar 6: Continued research, learning and benchmarking

It is recommended that the LGSETA and SALGA undertake a systematic comparative analysis of policy and governance frameworks in selected benchmark systems, such as those of Germany and the Netherlands, to generate empirically grounded insights for strengthening coalition-led municipalities. Furthermore, structured inter-municipal knowledge-exchange mechanisms should be established and institutionalised, and comprehensive, robust monitoring and evaluation systems should be designed, implemented, and continuously maintained.

Conclusion

The findings indicate that instability within coalition-governed municipalities cannot be attributed solely to inter-party rivalry. It is also embedded in structural deficiencies, weak enforcement and oversight mechanisms, and inadequately professionalised political–administrative interfaces. The existing governance architecture remains predominantly configured for majoritarian rule, thereby generating structural misalignment with the emergent realities of coalition-based governance. Consequently, stabilisation of coalition governance necessitates a combination of institutional redesign, shifts in the behavioural norms of political actors, and the further professionalisation of the municipal administration.

The study contends that stabilising coalition governance requires a comprehensive reform agenda that integrates six key pillars that serves as coalition building framework. Coalition governance can become a constructive and durable feature of South Africa’s local government if this framework is systematically institutionalised, undergirded by professionalised administrative practices, and reinforced by shared norms and values that promote cooperation and collaborative decision-making.

By LGSETA

This article is part of a series reporting on research commissioned by the Local Government Sector Education & Training Authority (LGSETA) (Contact: matodzir@lgseta.org.za).

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